Is Australian Local Government Ready for Localism? by Sansom, Graham
Policy Quarterly – Volume 15, Issue 2 – May 2019 – Page 25
Graham Sansom
Graham Sansom is an Adjunct Professor at the University of Technology Sydney. He was previously 
director of the Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government, and chief executive of the 
Australian Local Government Association. 
Abstract
Localism is widely supported as an antidote to what are seen as 
the adverse impacts of globalisation and one-size-fits-all, top-down 
central government. But interpretations of localism and views on 
how it should be practised vary greatly. This presents particular 
challenges for local government, which typically sees itself as the 
rightful beneficiary of a localism agenda focused on devolution and 
decentralisation, but must then confront difficult questions about its 
own institutional frameworks, its revenue base, and sharing power 
with local communities. While local government in New Zealand 
is exploring these issues through a national Localism project, its 
counterparts in Australia seem ill-prepared to follow suit.
Keywords local government, devolution, regions, communities, 
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Is Australian 
Local Government 
Ready for 
Localism? T
he recent launch in New Zealand of 
a national Localism project (LGNZ, 
n.d.) raises a number of interesting 
questions for observers of Australian local 
government. Those questions revolve 
around interpretations of ‘localism’ and 
the likelihood of a coherent localism 
agenda emerging in Australia. How might 
the New Zealand project translate across 
the Tasman Sea? Does Australian local 
government want to follow a similar path, 
and would it be ready to do so?
Interpreting localism
Support for localism reflects widespread 
concerns about, on the one hand, the 
adverse economic, social and environ-
mental impacts of globalisation, and, 
on the other, continuing centralisation 
of power in the hands of national 
governments (Albertson, 2017; Brooks, 
2018). Many believe that local action can 
address some of the ‘wicked’ problems 
that governments appear unwilling or 
unable to resolve: communities should be 
empowered both to deal with their local 
concerns and to help address ‘big picture’ 
issues. Localism is thus intertwined with 
the governance principle of subsidiarity: 
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central governments should act only with 
respect to those tasks that cannot be 
performed effectively at a more local level.
Precisely because it espouses such a 
broad agenda, definitions of localism and 
ambitions for its implementation vary 
dramatically. The Oxford dictionary 
suggests ‘Preference for one’s own area or 
region, especially when this results in a 
limitation of outlook’ or ‘A characteristic 
of a particular locality, such as a local idiom 
or custom.’ Cambridge has a different view: 
‘the idea that people should have 
control over what happens in their local 
area, that local businesses should be 
supported, and that differences between 
places should be respected’. 
‘Local government’ is not mentioned in 
either case, but there is a strong body of 
opinion that sees elected local councils as 
a principal means by which localism 
agendas may be pursued. This belief seems 
to lie at the heart of the New Zealand 
Localism project: 
Localism involves a new approach to 
governing New Zealand, one in which 
citizens and communities, working with 
and through their local governments, 
have a more active and meaningful role 
… This requires re-distributing roles 
and functions between central and local 
government. (LGNZ, n.d., p.3, emphasis 
added)
By contrast, the Commission on the 
Future of Localism, established by two 
British community-based organisations – 
Locality and Power to Change – concluded 
that ‘Reducing the debate on localism to 
the question of “what powers are devolved?” 
while a key part, misses the fundamental 
point about localism: people are the end 
goal, not local government’ (Commission 
on the Future of Localism, n.d., p.12). This 
point is highlighted in Taylor’s account of 
the ‘new localism’ adopted by Britain’s 
Labour government in the late 1990s. 
While local government was seen as a key 
player, it was ‘far from clear to minister [sic] 
and policy advisers in government that 
councils are the best bodies to promote 
relevant and effective forms of 
accountability and public engagement’ 
(Taylor, 2013, p.23). Other options were 
floated, such as the direct election of 
hospital boards and police chiefs, and there 
was talk of ‘double devolution’: power 
needed to be shifted downwards ‘from 
Whitehall and Westminster down to town 
halls, and from town halls to communities 
and citizens’ (Mulgan and Bury, 2006, p.5). 
This was the approach adopted by the 
Conservat ive–Liberal  Democrat 
government that assumed power in 2010. 
Its 2011 Localism Act strengthened to some 
degree the position of local government, 
but also included provisions that offered 
communities and civil society a greatly 
expanded role in local planning and service 
delivery. Prominent among those 
provisions were the right to bid to wrest 
ownership and/or management of services 
and facilities from councils, and processes 
for existing parish councils and newly 
created neighbourhood forums to prepare 
binding ‘neighbourhood plans’ that could 
amend councils’ land use and development 
policies. 
Parish, town or community councils 
(known collectively as ‘local councils’) 
function across much of England and 
Wales. They are all popularly elected and 
offer a ready-made vehicle for localism, 
especially if ‘double devolution’ is a central 
objective. Wills (2016) argues that 
‘institutional infrastructure – at the 
neighbourhood scale’ is imperative for 
localism to happen. Her research into the 
development of localism in urban England 
found that ‘in EVERY case, localism 
depended upon the existence of an 
independent neighbourhood forum that 
was able to represent local interests, develop 
an agenda for the local area, and make 
things happen’.
The policies of the UK government can 
also be seen as an expression of what might 
be termed ‘neo-liberal localism’, which is 
concerned with efficiency as much as 
democracy, through the medium of 
competition. In his global review of 
localism, Hartwich refers to the work of 
Hayek, who preferred local to central 
government, but favoured private provision 
of services above all, and Tiebout, who 
argued that residents and businesses should 
be able to choose between municipalities 
with differing policies, tax rates etc. 
Hartwich argues that: 
Subsidiarity is a central element of 
good governance …This is the best way 
of enlivening democracy, engaging 
citizens with the political process, and 
preserving individual freedom … Local 
government can be more efficient in the 
services it provides. Arguably, it could 
also provide them at a better quality 
within a system of competitive localism. 
(Hartwich, 2013, pp.13–14, 11–12, 30–
31)
 A very different strand of localism is 
‘direct action’ by communities in supporting 
local businesses, co-production of food 
and other necessities, tackling social issues 
and environmental sustainability. A typical 
example is Re>Think Local, a community 
organisation in the Hudson Valley, New 
York. Its objective is ‘co-creating a better 
Hudson Valley’ and it sees localism in the 
following terms:
Localism is about building communities 
that are more healthy and sustainable 
– backed by local economies that are 
stronger and more resilient ... The goal 
is real prosperity – for all … Localists 
also recognize that while our focus is 
primarily on our own communities, 
our vision is global. Each of us is 
Localism is fundamentally about ‘place’ 
and bringing people and organisations 
together within a framework of places in 
order to address social, economic and 
environmental concerns.
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crafting a piece of a larger mosaic – a 
global network of cooperatively 
interlinked local economies. (Re>Think 
Local, n.d.)
The reference to a global vision and 
network points to the crucial issue of scale: 
how local is local, and how does localism 
deal with wider concerns? Localism is 
fundamentally about ‘place’ and bringing 
people and organisations together within a 
framework of places in order to address 
social, economic and environmental 
concerns. It incorporates themes such as 
place-shaping, integrated place-based 
planning and service delivery, and 
collaborative leadership (Hambleton, 2011). 
But the geography of place is complex: 
spatial relationships vary depending on the 
issues involved. So as Stoker commented: 
‘The difficulty is that we are still very unclear 
about the territorial level at which to 
conduct the new localism. Is it the regional, 
county, district or neighbourhood level? If 
it is all four, how can the system be made 
coherent?’ He argued that localism must 
also address the big issues, and identified 
weaknesses in the framework and practice 
of local politics as a significant constraint to 
be overcome (Stoker, 2002, p.22).
In a similar vein, Wills highlights the 
recent shift in emphasis in Britain from 
neighbourhoods to devolution at the 
regional level, with the establishment of 
combined authorities of councils and 
negotiation of city/devolution deals 
between those authorities and central 
government. She notes: 
an expectation that these city deals will 
involve the further decentralisation of 
political power within the areas 
concerned but the jury is out on 
whether and how this will happen. The 
connections between city-deals and 
localism are yet to be seen and … many 
remain cynical that the city-deals will 
simply move from one set of elites in 
Westminster and Whitehall to another 
in the local town hall. (Wills, 2016)
This brings us back to questions about 
the role of local government within a 
broader conception of localism. The recent 
history of local government in New 
Zealand, and the intent of the current 
Localism project, offer a valuable point of 
reference for considering these questions, 
and in particular the prospects for localism 
in Australia.  
The New Zealand Localism project
The launch document for the New Zealand 
Localism project asserts that:
Instead of relying on central 
government to decide what is good for 
our communities it is time to empower 
councils and communities themselves 
to make such decisions. This means 
strengthening local self-government, 
putting people back in charge of 
politics and reinvigorating our 
democracy. We are seeking an active 
programme of devolution and 
decentralisation.
It goes on to invoke the principle of 
subsidiarity based on the following values: 
•	 that	the	allocation	of	responsibilities	to	
councils will be designed to ensure 
accountability is clear and elected 
members incentivised to act in the best 
interests of their communities; 
•	 that	citizens	will	have	a	meaningful	say	
about the range and nature of local 
services in their communities; 
•	 that	the	decentralisation	of	services	will	
be accompanied by financial resources 
commensurate with the cost of 
providing those services; and 
•	 that	localism	will	ensure	a	‘place-based’	
and integrated approach to the 
provision of services and local 
governance. (LGNZ, n.d., p.2)
This framework evidently favours a 
form of localism chiefly focused on, and 
led by, local government. Its reference to 
decentralisation of services is particularly 
worthy of note. First, it reflects a strong 
emphasis on improved service delivery 
being a key element and benefit of localism. 
Second, it implies that localism depends 
on central government either funding a 
sizeable proportion of the increased costs 
to councils, or enabling councils to raise 
additional revenues. With Local 
Government New Zealand’s support, the 
New Zealand Productivity Commission is 
currently undertaking a wide-ranging 
review of local government funding that 
will consider, among other things, options 
for new funding and financing tools 
(Productivity Commission, 2018). However, 
requests for additional grants carry the risk 
that central government will instead 
support provision of services by 
community organisations, as occurred in 
Britain, while councillors would have to 
shoulder the political risk of raising any 
new local taxes or charges. 
Another significant feature of the 
launch document is its emphasis on local 
government becoming more accountable 
for its expenditures and performance. It 
commits local government to independent, 
external performance reviews, and to 
rigorous scrutiny of expenditure and policy 
decision making that ensures community 
needs and preferences are met in an 
efficient and effective manner (LGNZ, n.d., 
p.2). This perhaps echoes neo-liberal 
‘competitive localism’.
Oddly, the document does not 
mention the potential of New Zealand’s 
statutory regional councils and 
neighbourhood-scale community boards, 
which are either wholly or partly elected 
... the New Zealand Productivity 
Commission is currently undertaking a 
wide-ranging review of local government 
funding that will consider, among other 
things, options for new funding and 
financing tools 
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and could be used to facilitate localism 
agendas at different spatial scales. Over 
the years unitary authorities (local 
councils with wider powers) have replaced 
some regional councils, and in many 
places there are no community boards, 
their establishment being optional.1 
Nevertheless, experience gained over three 
decades in allocating responsibilities 
across three different forms of local 
government, and engaging with and 
empowering local people through 
community boards, would seem to 
provide a solid foundation for multi-scale 
and multifaceted localism. Australian 
local government certainly has much to 
learn from that experience.
Prospects in Australia
Drawing together the various strands of 
localism outlined above, a localism agenda 
for Australia might comprise the following 
elements:
•	 devolution	of	additional	powers	and	
functions from central to local 
governments, and from local 
governments to representative locality-
based organisations;
•	 expanded	regional	cooperation	between	
local governments to enhance their 
capacity to address ‘big picture’ issues 
affecting the well-being of their 
communities;
•	 more	 widespread	 use	 by	 local	
governments of integrated, place-based 
planning and service delivery; and
•	 enhancing	 local	democracy	through	
improvements to electoral systems and 
greater emphasis on participatory and 
deliberative mechanisms; 
An agenda along these lines was in fact 
put forward in a declaration adopted by 
delegates to the 2017 Future of Local 
Government conference held in Melbourne. 
The declaration asserted that:
Our present ways of thinking and 
governing are neither coping with the 
pace of change nor meeting citizens’ 
expectations. There is an urgent need 
for a fresh approach and responsive 
leadership … Councils have a unique 
mandate to support, represent and give 
voice to ‘communities of place’. They 
can provide an ideal platform for 
governments at all levels to strengthen 
their engagement with communities – 
and there is also a real opportunity to 
bring about a renaissance in local 
government itself.
It then urged local governments to 
‘Consider how their own roles and approach 
to community leadership may need to 
change, and … Adopt a decentralised 
model for their own activities, including 
place-based planning and service delivery, 
and devolving decision-making to 
communities’ (Future of Local Government 
Conference, 2017).
So is Australian local government 
willing and able to champion such an 
agenda? To answer that question it is 
important first to highlight some critical 
features of Australia’s federal system. This 
is characterised by what might be termed 
‘double centralisation’: federal (national) 
expenditures as a share of the total are 
around the OECD average, but the states 
and territories account for nearly all the 
rest and receive all but $3 billion or so of 
federal transfers. Also, the states control 
every aspect of local government, and 
intervene in local affairs more or less as 
they see fit, while the Australian Capital 
Territory has no separate local governments 
at all. Local government accounts for only 
4–5% of total public expenditure, less than 
half the New Zealand figure.
Rather than devolve responsibilities to 
local government, the states have repeatedly 
centralised functions. For example, in the 
1990s the New South Wales government 
‘resumed’ electricity distribution from 
county councils, and almost every state has 
increased its direct control over land use 
planning and major urban developments. 
All the main utilities and public services 
(transport, education, health, police etc.) 
are run by state agencies or have been 
privatised, except for some public transport 
in Brisbane, and water supply and sewerage 
across Queensland, Tasmania2 and non-
metropolitan New South Wales. In 
particular, the states totally dominate the 
governance of metropolitan regions, where 
local government remains divided into 
numerous municipalities that play a 
distinctly ‘junior’ role. South East 
Queensland is a partial exception, due to 
the size and spending power of Brisbane 
City Council and its populous and rapidly 
growing neighbours, including Gold Coast. 
But even there recent years have seen 
increasing centralisation. Significantly, 
none of the states has legislated to require 
councils to establish regional local 
governments to which they or the federal 
government could readily devolve powers 
and functions (Sansom, 2019, p.16).
Faced with these challenges, Australian 
local government tends to focus on its 
weaknesses rather than its strengths. It 
appears preoccupied with state centralism 
on the one hand, and the belief that it is 
entitled to more federal financial support 
on the other. Councils and their 
representative associations rarely project 
their potential to contribute considerable 
financial and human resources to state and 
national agendas. Councils generally see 
their revenue base as inadequate for the 
tasks they already face, and devolution of 
more functions would undoubtedly be 
opposed unless it was matched by increased 
grants or expanded revenue sources – the 
same position as that adopted by Local 
Government New Zealand. In part this 
reflects the continuing presence – and 
influence – of large numbers of small (in 
population) rural-remote municipalities 
that already depend on federal and state 
[Australian] councils and their 
representative associations rarely project 
their potential to contribute considerable 
financial and human resources to state 
and national agendas.
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grants to discharge even basic functions 
such as building and maintaining local 
roads.
The sector’s mindset was apparent in 
policy statements for the New South 
Wales and federal elections held 
respectively in March and May 2019. Local 
Government NSW (the state association 
of councils) set out 12 priorities (Local 
Government NSW, n.d.). At first glance 
there are hints of a robust localism agenda 
in headings such as ‘Support local 
decision-making’ and ‘Promote strong 
governance and democracy’, but it soon 
becomes apparent that the focus is firmly 
on local government’s longstanding 
concerns about inadequate state grants, 
cost shifting and rate pegging; excessive 
state controls and interventions in local 
affairs; removal of land use planning 
powers; and ‘domestic’ issues such as 
election spending laws, councillor 
superannuation and skills shortages. 
For the federal election, the Australian 
Local Government Association (ALGA) 
proposed 12 initiatives to ‘deliver for 
Australian communities’ (ALGA, 2018). All 
but three were wholly or largely bids for 
additional federal grants to councils, 
amounting to a doubling of current 
transfers (some $3 billion more per 
annum). There were repeated assertions 
that local government simply could not do 
more with its own resources. While several 
initiatives portrayed local government as a 
‘partner’ in the federation, none spelled out 
ways in which councils could or would play 
a stronger role without more federal 
assistance. 
At the same time, Australian local 
government has demonstrated a marked 
reluctance to create or support substantial 
regional or neighbourhood entities. 
Councils everywhere are free to establish 
regional agreements and organisations to 
discharge some or all of their responsibilities, 
and all states except Victoria have 
customised legislative frameworks in place. 
However, as noted earlier, regional 
collaboration remains voluntary. Regional 
organisations of councils (ROCs) and 
similar non-statutory alliances are 
widespread, but their activities are typically 
limited to advocacy, some joint 
procurement and perhaps a few other 
shared services, non-binding strategic 
plans, and externally funded regional 
projects (Sansom, 2019, pp.11–13). There 
are evident concerns that state governments 
will interfere in the operations of statutory 
entities, and that ‘too much’ cooperation 
could lead to ‘amalgamation by stealth’ 
(ibid., p.20). 
Such concerns were reflected in the 
reaction of Local Government NSW to 
proposals made by the New South Wales 
Independent Local Government Review Panel 
(Local Government NSW, 2014, pp.51–6; 
Independent Local Government Review Panel, 
2013, 81– 87) for new regional joint 
organisations. These were intended to facilitate 
greatly expanded cooperation amongst local 
councils and with state agencies, not least as 
an alternative to unwanted council 
amalgamations. But the association argued 
successfully for a much weaker version of the 
concept which largely maintains the voluntary 
‘opt-in, opt-out’ culture of ROCs and restricts 
mandatory cooperation to non-binding 
regional strategies. 
There are no specific legislative 
provisions anywhere in Australia for 
neighbourhood bodies along the lines of 
New Zealand’s community boards, 
although again councils are free to form 
area-based committees with community 
representatives, and to delegate some 
decision-making powers. Indeed, many 
have done so. But a study of the widespread 
use of citizen committees as a source of 
advice and to help manage community 
services and facilities struck a cautious note. 
It concluded that if formally recognised 
within a community governance 
framework, ‘citizen committees have the 
potential to represent and advocate from 
a community perspective. Unfortunately 
this potential is seldom realised. Councils 
appear reluctant to explore the possibilities 
of adapting citizen committees to fulfil this 
kind of remit’ (Bolitho, 2013, p.27). 
When the Independent Local 
Government Review Panel recommended 
that the Local Government Act make 
specific provision for elected community 
boards as an option, this was flatly opposed 
by Local Government NSW, which 
dismissed the idea as ‘introducing another 
layer of government for no apparent 
purpose’ (Independent Local Government 
Review Panel, 2013, pp.93–5; Local 
Government NSW, 2014, p.61). Similarly, 
Dollery, Kortt and Crase argued that ‘there 
is no need to “reinvent the wheel” in NSW 
local government by introducing additional 
“sub-council” structures since existing 
regulation already enables local authorities 
to engage in local co-governance’ (Dollery, 
Kortt and Crase, 2014, p.747). This 
conveniently ignores the fact that under 
‘existing regulation’ only councils can 
determine what forms of ‘local co-
governance’ may be implemented; 
communities are not enabled to decide 
these matters for themselves.
A similar discussion had taken place in 
Queensland in 2007. The Queensland 
Local Government Reform Commission 
was required to consider ‘the ability of 
community boards (and other similar 
structures) to deliver services and preserve 
and enhance community and cultural 
There are no specific legislative 
provisions anywhere in Australia for 
neighbourhood bodies along the lines 
of New Zealand’s community boards, 
although again councils are free to form 
area-based committees with community 
representatives, and to delegate some 
decision-making powers. 
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identity’. After quoting at length from an 
unfavourable (and unreferenced) review 
of New Zealand’s community boards 
submitted by the Local Government 
Association, the commission saw: 
no advantage in incorporating 
community boards as a formal part of 
Queensland’s local government 
structure … installing another tier of 
‘elected’ members to a community 
board derogates from the concept of 
representative government. Nor should 
ratepayers be faced with the burden of 
having to fund a second tier of 
community representation. (Local 
Government Reform Commission, 
2007, pp.49–50)
In the absence of substantial entities at 
neighbourhood/district level, the electoral 
system for councils assumes particular 
importance. In Queensland, New South 
Wales and Victoria – that is, for the great 
majority of Australians – voting in local 
government elections is compulsory, as it is 
for state and federal elections, and voter 
turnout is around 70% or more. However, 
in South Australia, Western Australia and 
Tasmania voting remains voluntary: turnout 
in the former two is very low (around 30–
35%), although in the recent Tasmanian 
elections it reached close to 60%. This may 
be explained in part by the use of postal 
voting, the relatively small populations of 
most local government areas, and the 
popular election of all mayors.
From a localism perspective, a significant 
drawback of local government electoral 
systems across Australia is the typically low 
number of councillors per head of 
population in most metropolitan areas and 
large regional centres. Ratios of one 
councillor (usually part-time except in 
Queensland) to 10,000 or more residents 
are not uncommon, and several states have 
promoted further reductions in the number 
elected. Moreover, there is a trend to electing 
councillors ‘at large’ in a single electorate 
rather than by locality-based wards or 
divisions. These features reflect the idea that 
councillors should operate as a small, policy-
setting ‘board of directors’ that leaves 
implementation of policy and programmes 
in the hands of professional managers. 
While all this may not bode well for an 
Australian localism, there is another story. 
As the 2017 Future of Local Government 
conference declaration acknowledged, many 
councils do have a record of achievement 
on which to build. ‘Community 
development’ has been a recurring theme 
in local government practice since at least 
the 1970s. In the early 1990s ALGA 
formulated and secured federal government 
support for a programme of ‘integrated 
local area planning’ (ILAP) that promoted 
local government’s role in ‘place 
management’, including coordination of 
planning and service delivery with federal 
and state agencies. ALGA advocated six 
ILAP principles: 
•	 More	appropriate	[tailored]	responses	
to differing local circumstances and 
needs;
•	 A	holistic,	integrated	approach	to	the	
issues affecting a local area;
•	 A	shared	understanding	of	those	issues,	
and a shared vision of desired futures 
•	 More	effective	use	of	resources	through	
improved coordination between 
programs;
•	 Increased	community	involvement	in	
planning and management processes
•	 Pursuit	of	local	government’s	mandate	
to play a leadership role. (ALGA, 1993, 
p.1).
Although the ILAP initiative as such 
petered out in the mid-1990s, it anticipated 
what later became known as ‘new localism’, 
and very similar principles emerged again 
in the ‘integrated planning and reporting’ 
(IPR) provisions added to the New South 
Wales Local Government Act in 2009.3 
These require councils to work with their 
communities to prepare community 
strategic plans and delivery programmes 
that clearly identify key strategic issues and 
desired outcomes, and how those outcomes 
are to be achieved through concerted 
action by the council and other responsible 
agencies, including community 
organisations. Similar provisions were 
adopted in Western Australia a few years 
later. 
More broadly, over the past two decades 
Australian local government has made 
great strides in improving community 
consultation and engagement, and some 
local government acts now require councils 
to prepare comprehensive community 
engagement strategies that go far beyond 
consulting from time to time on specific 
plans and projects. A number of councils 
have experimented with deliberative 
democracy through citizen juries and 
online panels in order to determine 
expenditure priorities and obtain regular 
community input on current and emerging 
issues. In Victoria, councils have assisted 
residents to prepare formal (but non-
statutory) community plans that outline a 
vision for the township or locality and 
identify priorities for expenditure on 
facilities, services and other initiatives.4 
And, as noted earlier, councils routinely 
work with citizen committees and 
community organisations in the provision 
or management of services and facilities.
But it remains telling that only one 
council, Waratah–Wynyard in north-west 
Tasmania, has formally established and 
empowered a ‘community board’ for part 
of its area, and even there the members of 
the board are appointed by the council 
(after expressions of interest and a selection 
process), not elected by local people 
(Waratah–Wynyard Council, n.d.). 
Conclusion
Despite some significant constraints, 
Australian local government could, if it 
wished, pursue a substantial localism 
agenda. Local government acts provide 
a power of general competence or its 
equivalent, including the ability to establish 
 ... only one council, Waratah–
Wynyard in north-west Tasmania, has 
formally established and empowered a 
‘community board’ for part of its area ...
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regional and neighbourhood bodies 
and to delegate decision-making (but 
not budgetary) authority to community 
committees. Moreover, most urban 
municipalities and some rural shires enjoy 
a high level of financial independence: 
their relatively limited responsibilities are 
well matched by their own-source revenues 
from property rates and service charges. 
And as the populations of metropolitan 
municipalities and regional cities continue 
to grow, so does the need to consider 
whether different localities within those 
local government areas would benefit 
from tailored approaches to governance 
and service delivery.
But many – perhaps most – councils 
remain preoccupied with the burdens of 
state centralism and the perception 
(unquestionable reality in the case of rural-
remote areas) that they already lack 
sufficient resources to do their job. Local 
government thus shows little or no 
inclination to take the risk of playing a 
larger role. There are of course exceptions 
to this generalisation, but the prevailing 
narrative is one of incapacity. The New 
South Wales Independent Local 
Government Review Panel called for 
‘revitalisation’ and for the ‘old debates and 
slogans’ about amalgamations, cost shifting, 
rate pegging and increased grants across 
the board to be put aside (Independent 
Local Government Review Panel, 2013, 
p.7). But they persist.
It therefore seems unlikely that even the 
local government-centric version of 
localism set out in the launch document 
for the New Zealand Localism project 
would win majority support. Devolution 
might beget more cost shifting, while 
increased regional collaboration could 
threaten councils’ autonomy and lead to 
‘amalgamation by stealth’. Prospects for 
closer engagement and co-governance with 
local communities are perhaps brighter, 
especially given emerging legislative 
requirements for engagement strategies 
that include elements of deliberative 
democracy. But there are no moves towards 
elected neighbourhood bodies or far-
reaching delegation of decision-making 
authority. 
Stoker saw the need ‘to construct 
political and institutional forms that reflect 
and can manage the diverse, complex and 
conflict-laden nature of localities’ (Stoker, 
2002, p.22). Local politics must both 
address the ‘everyday’ things people care 
about and deal with bigger issues. This 
requires a willingness to consider how local 
and regional democracy might evolve to 
meet new challenges. Australian local 
government may be clinging to a model 
that becomes increasingly redundant.
1 However, across New Zealand citizens can initiate the 
establishment of communitiy boards, and the amalgamated 
Auckland Council, created in 2009, has local boards 
mandated by its Act, which have specific statutory functions. 
Most serve much larger populations than community boards 
elsewhere.
2 Tasmania has a state-wide corporation owned by local 
government.
3 IPR also reflected New Zealand’s arrangements at the time 
for the determination of preferred community outcomes and 
preparation of long-term council community plans.
4 See, for example, https://www.mildura.vic.gov.au/Council-
Services/Community-Development/Community-Planning.
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